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Abstract 
Hugo CMvez. Vladimir Putin and Silvio Berlusronl are the flawed leaders 
of three very different rountries. Various elements of structure and agency allow 
sud! individuals to attain and maintain power despite their faults. An analysis of 
Chivez's leadershipstyle,thenatureofVenczuelandemocracyandVcnezucla's 
political culture sets the pattern for comparison with Putin and Berlusroni. 
CMvez also provides the basis to explore whether Latin American political 
concepts such as elected caudillismo and delegative democracy may be U5C"fully 
applied to leaders in other countries. Ultimately, it is the failure of various 
structural components In Venezuela,. Russia and Italy that allow these men to 
govem. "They are a ll. indeed, elected clllldillos and Venezuela and Russia are 
examples of delegative democracy. It is because Berlusconi is ronsidenod. by 
observers, to be a western democratic leader that he e:ICilpe6 the negative 
jud gments heaped on Chavez and Putin. 
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Bibliography and Rcitn'flctS 
Introd uction 
Venezuela. Russia and Italy are sovereign states in a world where 
democracy is dl'fmed by western standards. Observers often view two of these 
countries as examples of failed democracies and the three leaders II!i either 
flamboyant playboys or quasi-dictators. Indeed, President HugoQavez of 
Venezuela and former President Vladimir Putin of Russia are regularly viewed as 
the leaders of authoritarian regimes contributing to the ruination of an entrenched 
democracy and a fledgling democracy, respectively. Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusooniof Italy, on the other hand, is generaJly accepled as the leader oi a 
democratic nation whose time in office has been plagued by numerous legal and 
personal issues thai bring both his honesty and his abiUty to lead into question. 
First-year political science students are taught that democracy mean<; more 
than voting and having a choice among more than one candidate for public office. 
It takes some time for such students to comprehend that democracy is a 
complicated, multi-d imen5i<mal concept and that the styleof democracy may 
vary from one country to another. Students are also taught that checks and 
balances exist to ensure that open and honest elections are held and that the 
resulting leaders fol1ow specific rules for governance. llle most common 
components of a suco.>ssful democracy include the constitution, laws, political 
parties (both ruling and opposition), institutions, interest group5 and civil society. 
These elements, along with political culture, constitute the structure portion of 
structure and agency. Agency, on the other hand, is defined as Nthe faculty of 
actionH (Scruton 2007, 13). In the casc of Venezuela, Russia and Italy Haction" Is 
taken by political actors who took advantage of particular situations thai were 
open to them. In order 10 attain and retain power, Oclvez, Putin and Berlusconi 
were able to capitalize on their countries' lack of parties,. of party leadership, and 
of active opposition., within a contextd\aracterized by weak structure. ~are 
the common denominators thai tie together these three otherwise distinctly 
different men and their throe equally distinct nations. 
This thesis will ronsider which elements of structure and agency allowed 
individuals such as Oclvez, rutin and Berlusroni 10 emerge as political leaders 
and continue to gain power despite apparent flaws in their polides, actions and 
leadership, and whether additional underlying factorscontribuled to their rise to 
pow~. 
The thesis wi!! also explore two theories with roots in Latin American 
politics: elected calUli/lismo and delegative democracy. Both involve a concept of 
democracy which is slightly removed from traditional liberal democratic theory. 
A CIIudillo is a dictator with a decidedly Latin American flair. According to Hill 
the term hall Ma resonance that suggests the unique milieu and condition elements 
of Spanish America- (Hill 1992, 5). In tum Dludillismo is "the art of obtaining and 
retaining power through a network of confederates in the manner of many South 
American politicians- (Scruton 2007, 83). The addition of "elected" created a 
relatively new term. If not a new political concept, to denote men who govem as 
DludiJ/os but are elected by society. David Close dermes elected CAudillismo all 
"government by a single - usually charismatic - leader, driven by personal 
ambitions and with lillie interest in building any institutions besides his own 
perpetuation in power ... ~ (Oase 2004. 4). 
While Chavez's detractors would likely place him in this category easily, 
the term, as used by Close, was meant to apply to leaders such all former 
President Amoldo AIeman of Nicaragua. Aleman Wall the quintessential elected 
alUdilw and his leadership style rould be nothing except detrimental to 
democracy in Nicaragua. It should be obvious that no single individual rouId 
manage to ru in a country's democracy without the complicity of the government 
and other political parties. Given the geographic oonnotationsof thetenn. 
political observers would simply prefer to avoid the term elected CAudillo with 
reference to either Putin or Berlusooni. However, that does not mean that the term 
would be inappropriate. 
~~~-----------------
Anyone who studies politics and government has, at some point, struggled 
to find a suitable definition of democracy. The definitions are numerous and 
diverse. For the purpose of this thesis, democracy will be defined as Mliterally, 
government by the people as a whole rather than by any section. class or interest 
within it" (Scruton 2007, 169).ln the mid 1990s Guillenno O'Donnell described a 
"new spedes~ among the many existing forms of democracy which he called 
~delegative democracy~ (O'Donnell 1994, 55). He claimed that this new form of 
democracy is sufficiently different from the others to warrant a new political 
theory. According to O'DonneU delegative democracy: 
" ... rests on the premise that whoever wins an election 
to the presidency is thercl>y entitled to govem as he or 
she sees fit constrained only by the hard fact!lofcxisting 
power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of 
office. The president is taken to be the embodiment of 
the nation and the main custodian and definer of interests. 
The policies of his government need bear no resemblance 
to the promises of his campaign - has not the president 
been aulhorized to govem ashe (or she) thinksbest?q 
(O'Donnell l 994,SS-56). 
In the most basic!!e11S(', a society elects its own dictator to govern as he or ~he sees 
fil. The voters accept that their leader will act in the best interest of the people and 
the nation. 
Delegative democracy is oflen perceived as a weak or defective form of 
democracy (Merkel 2004, SO). It should not be a foregone conclusion that anything 
other than strong embedded electoral democracy is undesirable. In this case it 
should be considered an instance where individuals are free to choose their leader 
via constilutionaIly appropriate elections. However, voters choose an individual 
aside from the political party that the individual is associated with and without 
particular attention to his backgrOWld, experience or ability to govern _ they vole 
for the man and nothing more.' Indeed, IhE' English-language press reported than 
a substantial number of Venezuelan volers supported Chiivez., the man, and 
believed that he alone could improve the economy and the lives of poor 
Venezuelans. 
II is because Chavez epitomizes elected caudill05 in established Latin 
American democrades with failing structures thai he is the firslleader examined 
in this thesis. He is the leader againsl whom rutin and Berlusooni will be 
measured to assess the viability of transferring Latin American political theories 
such as elected CIludiJ/ismo and delegative democracy to other leaders and 
countrit.>s around the world. eMvez was elected in accordance 10 the Venezuelan 
constitution. He wenl on to change that constitution, seek re-election twit(! more 
and abolish presidential tenn limits aU within the established political rules. He 
declared his intention 10 govern Venezuela indefinitely and that is why, by 
western standards, he is a dictator who has single-handedly destroyed democracy 
in Venezuela. 
He is a strong charismatic president who e:o;pounds on the strengths of 
average Venezuelans and of Latin America while railing against the United States 
(US). He has many internal enemies among representatives of the private sector, 
interest groups and the political opposition but thus far, Chavez has persevered. 
Like Putin, Chavez entered elected office witha certam amount ofexperlence 
dealing with government. In Ouivez's case this was due to his time in the 
military. 
Beyond their oil-rich-nation status Venezuela and Russia have little in 
common. Russia is a former superpower whose fall from grace has been long and 
devastating. Certainly Russia claims precious little democratic history and her 
fonner president cannot claim to have mobilized the nation with his charismatic 
speeches. However, Putin is a man who led Russia in accordance with his 
personal vision for the country. He aimed to restore Russia's greatness without 
particular attention to the consequences of his actions. Like QtAvez,.. he is 
perceived as a dictator. In this ca;;e he has not destroyed existing democracy but 
rather he stands accused of obliterating. though perhaps only temporarily, 
Russia's progress towards democracy. 
Also like Chavez, rutin is perceived by many to be anti-American or, at 
least, anti-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and anti-West. He, too, 
lared his share of internal enemies but these have been imprisoned, forced into 
exile or effectively gagged. Any individual or group that stood against the 
president faced potentially deadly consequences. Putin was the architect of the 
tough military and political stance that Yeltsin's government took in its second 
campaign in Chechnya in September 1999.' Putin boldly declared that the Russian 
forces would uwipe them (the Cha:hens) out" (Riasanovsky 2005, 625). Average 
Russians were divided over the conflict in Chechnya. Many supported this 
military resurgence while others saw no rea!IQn to waste the lives of young 
Russian men in what was perceived to be a hopeless conflict. 
However, unlike Chavez, Putin was confronted by a series of occurrences 
which caused observers to question his ability to lead in times of crisis and claim 
that old Soviet habits remained. Five months after taking office Putin Was faced 
with the loss of the ballistic missile submarine Kursk! The vacationing Putin did 
not return to the Kremlin or speak with the families of the lost crew for days. 
Instead the Kremlin fabricated an alternate version of the events surrounding the 
sinking. Only after outcry from the public and the media did Putin act. This was 
the last time that the media would be pennitted to criticize his leadership because 
the government's media clampdown commenced shortly after thi5 incident. 
Both the siege at the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow and the massilCI'\' at the 
school in BesIan involved Chedlen rebels,' After the September 2001 attacks in the 
US these were considered terrorist acts. Putin refused to pennit any negotiation 
with terrorists. A Special Forces unit armed with poison gas was dispatched to the 
theatre. The government took no responsibility for the deaths of more than one 
hundred hostages stating that they were not intended to be harmed {Shevtsova 
2005,254). In Beslan,. govemment inactivity and refusal to negotiate with the 
terrorists led to the deaths of between three and six hundred hostages (Shofvl!:iOVa 
2005,389). Again the Kremlin chose to present its own version of the tragedy. 
The response of Putin and the Kremlin to these incidents brought into 
question exactly how far Putin's Russia has travelled from Soviet Russia where 
the state controlled every aspect of Russian life through a scries of threats and 
half truths. There is a case to be made that Putin is an elected caudilw. He claimed 
publically to believe in democracy but did not ind icate exactly which type of 
democracy held his attention. Like Chavez, Putin abided by the tenets of an 
established constitution to assume the presidency and, laler, to step down when 
his second term ended. Unlike Chavez, I'll' did not seek doggedly to alter the 
constitution to maintain his position. He merely transferred his popularity and 
vision for Russia to another office. 
Italy is nei!hcroil rich nora fOl"Jl1ersuperpower. It has endured its share of 
political intrigue, poor leadership and corruption. Political rorruption was among 
the factors that brought both Chavez and Berlusroni to power. Any possibility of 
similarities between Chavez, Putin and Berlusconi may appear to be disquieting 
to the reader. Howevcr, it is because Berlusroni is not regularly perceived to be a 
dictator determined to undermine democracy in lIaly that he was included in thill 
thesis. Unlike Ch.ivez and Putin, Berlusroni is a friend to the West. Indeed heisa 
western leader, one of those with whom Chavez and Putin occasionally 
experience contentious relations. Other western leaders may occasionally balk at 
Berlusconi's behaviour or his media gaffes but they do not view him with the 
animosity that they reserve for the other leaders exarnined here 
What is interesting ill that Berlusroni's personal style, his flamboyance and 
his hold over Italian politics are evidence of some of the characteristics necessary 
for the caudillo label. He is also reactive like Chavez and single-minded like Putin. 
He has endured few of the political challenges faced by the other two leaders. 
Berlusronl's enemies have not been funded by the US and his reactions have not 
been tested by incidents comparable to BesIan. But where Chavez and rutin 
appear to govern Vencwela and Russia with clear plans.. Berlusconi appears to 
govern Italy capriciously. He has also spent a significant amount of lime 
defending himself from corruption and conflict of interest allegations. Like 
Chivez and Putin, Berlusconi has a number of detractors who claim that he is 
unfit to lead. However, in this case, such assertioru are based on his lack of 
JXllitical experience and his legal problems rather than on any possible desire to 
undo Italian dernocracy. 
This thesis is based on the analysis of secondary, English-language 
sources.' There are many comprehensive biographies about each of the three 
world leaders detailed here. Multiple works were chosen from this category 10 
span the period that saw each of these men in power. General history sources 
were included 10 p rovide necessary background information. Various political 
works. both general and theory specific. were used to establish definitiom and 
provide JXllitical background. TIlt Sialtsmtm's Yurbook (2009) and Scruton's 
Dicliemllry ofPo/iliCil/ TJwughl were also used 10 provide basic statistics and basic 
defmitionsrespectively, 
An effort was made to empltasi~ only books and academic joul"Tlals 
relating to Chavez,. rutin and Berlusconi,. their governing styles and the political 
climates of the related nations. This was a conscious decision which,. hopefully, 
avoided biased sources. As is often the case when dealing with controversia~ 
cootcmporary figures. each of these leaders garners a substantial amount of 
popular press coV('rage. Research for this thesis confinned that much of this 
coverage is partisan and accusatory while revealing nothing tangible about either 
leader's ability to lead or the motivation for his decision-making. 
Unfortunately, it is not only popular magazines but also a number of 
scholarly journal articles that cast Chave<!; and Putin as maniacal dictators 
determined to destroy or lake over the world. In Putin's case there are many 
comparisons to Joseph Stalin. Similar sources rarely cast Berlusooni as anything 
other than a playboy millionaire who plays at politia; while, thus far, avoiding 
impri9OllJllent. This widespread media trend made the 9Carclt for unbiased 
information difficult. Materials that were found 100 partisan to contribute to the 
construction of a suffidently dear picture of the current polltical scene in either 
the nations or of the leaders in question wereomilted. 
Gregory Wilpert is a strong supporter of Ch.ivcz. His book ell/mging 
Vt ntzutla!ry TtV;ing Power ~amines Chavez's time in office, from his election in 
1998 until 2007. Despilethe author's potentially partisan political view, this isa 
detailed account of the multiple changes to the Venezuelan OOI1lItitution. Chavez's 
difficulties in office, the nationalization of various corporations and the enactment 
of the Enabling Law in January 2007. Tht Battlt o/Venezuela by Michael 
McCaughan is essentia!ly a political history which addresses the political climate 
that led to Chfivez's election. It gives details of the important political parties and 
80mI' of their candidates. The book aIsoexamines the attempted coup against 
CMvezin2002. 
Chesa Boudin sat down with OIAvez to ask the Venezuelan president 100 
questiof1!:l about Venezuela. The resulting book, The VenezuElan Revoluticn: 100 
Questions - 100 AnsWt'1'S is an attempt to ascertain exactly who Chavez ill as a 
leader and as a revolutionary. In mOiSt respects Boudin is successful. She provides 
iruiight into the BoIivarian ideology, the manipulation of the constitution,. political 
foes and the future of Venezuela acrording to OIavez. Prtsidents Withoul Partin 
provides an overview of how men without political backgrounds attain power 
and the lengths that they must go through to maintain it. In this book Javier 
Corrales examines party building, relationships between. such leaders and the 
military and the compromises that must be made. 
Of the sourres consulted for the Putin chapter, LiliaShevtsova'sPutin's 
Russiil is an excellent book about many of the events and decisions of Putin's 
presidency, presented as a factual aerount of rutin's time in the president's office. 
She covers everything from his appointment by Yeltsin through the sinking of the 
Kursk and Beslan,. the acolytes and enemies, internal and extemal policies and 
Potin's decision-making processes. Her attempt at oo;ernve writing is to be 
commended. Peter Truscott produced an equally factual account of rutin's time 
in office in his book Putin"s P~. This book was most useful for its 
ell"amination of rutin's early political involvement, his attitude toward Chedmya 
and his proposed reforms of everything from the judiciary to the private sector. 
In his book Putin: Russia's C/wice, Richard Sakwa delves into just how 
difficult it is for an individual to lead Russia. In rutin's case this means juggling 
his acolytes, the military, the international political community and the Russian 
people, Sakwa also writes about Russia's predisposition toward patrimonial 
leaders and the issues attached to such leadership arrangements. One of the 
neWC!it boobmnsulted for the rutin chapter is Prlroslate by Marshall Goldman. 
Despite its tiUe, this is not just a book about oil and the benefits of petrodollars. It 
also includC!i a 101 of information about rutin's purge of the political, banking and 
private sectors. It is about how Putin maintains power. 
Paul Ginsborg's book Silvio &rlusconi: TdroisKm, PCIWC' and Patrimony is a 
relatively short book which is packed with information about everything from 
Berlusroni"s early entrepreneurial ventures through his early days in politi(l'j and 
his time in office. He pays particular attention to the marketing tactics used 10 
portray Berlusroni as the political leader of choice for the Italian people. Ginsborg 
presents a relatively unbiased account of Berlusroni as a political leader. Uke 
Ginsborg, Patrick McCarthy writes a lot about Italy. His book The Crisis uflM 
ltaJum Slslte details post War politics in Italy. For this thesis it was particularly 
useful for its coverage of corruption. clientelism and the poHticaJ scandals of the 
early 1990s. the biographical sketches at the beginning of this book were 
invaluable. 
Michael Shin and John Agnew explore in detail elections and voting 
patterns since 1994 in their book Balusami·s ltaly: Mapping Contemporm-y ltiililm 
Politics. They examine Berlusconi·s geographic popularity and both the positive 
and negative aspects of Berlusconi's political style. 'T'M Sacko! Romt by Alexander 
Stille is the most biased book used for the chapter on Bertusconi. The title alone 
indicates the author's view of Italy's prime minister. However, the book does 
indude u~l facts and supplementary information. Several of the authors 
COI1!lulted for this chapter share Stille's disdain for Berlusroni and his methods of 
governing. 
In addition to the Introduction, the thesis i.s organized in three chapters 
wi th a Conclusion. The flT!ll ctoaph.'1"examines Hugo Q\~Ve:l:'S leadership style, 
the nature of Venezuelan democracy and Venezuela's political culture. TlUs 
chapter will set the pattern for comparison for the leaders in each of the 
subsequent chapters. Chapter Two will ex<Imine leadership style with reference 10 
Vladimir Putin's presidency and politics, and culture in Russia. In Chapter Three 
this line of analysis will be applied to Silvio Berlusconi's leadership and Italy. 
While there is little doubt that Italy is a liberal democracy, as defined by western 
standards, it is interesting to speculate about the extent to whim Prime Minister 
Bertusroni is an elected cliudillll and how his appetite for power may be tempered. 
The Conclusion summarizes the findings of the preceding chaptet"!i and offers 
possible explanations regarding potential underlying factors \fult allowed, and 
still allow, political leaders such as Chavez, rutin and Berlusconi to govern as 
they do. 
NOTES 
'Ii..,.., I ~the masculino: pronoun bec;JUI<! charismalic lNdersare ,...,...Iy, if evIPr, female. 
'1heflrstOled>er!mrtflkl~lnl994wellbefo"'Pulinbec;Jmepreslden,(Ri ... oI>OVJky2005. 
617). 
' n.. Kursk was 1001 with oil IwIdJ in the Bar ... ts Sm In August 2000. 
· ln O<:tot.::r2002.gr(IUpol~flghtenlool<approxilll<lteIYelahll\undredtt-tregoert 
oo.tage al thiJ MOII(OW I .... tre (Shevl$(lv, 2005, 253~ laler, in August 2OOf, a multi...thnk 
terrorist group took morelhan one thou!.and sru<k>ntJ, staffand paunbJ hattage in a odIool In 
Noriho-till(Shevbova2005,388} . 
• Atthi. juncture It ohould boP noted thai """,man form$<1l spolUng w,,", used for Russian nam"" 
politiaol porti"" government Ilj!mdes, etc. rather than the aoaMmk Library ofC""3"'"" Ilyleof 
transl!t('rati(ln. 
Chapter One 
Hugo CMvez Frias first appeared on Venezuela's political!iCef\C as a 
go/pistA.' It was 1992 and Chavez was just one on a long list of military officers 
who sought to overthrow the elected leader of a Latin American country. What 
distinguishes Chavez from the others on that list is that he went on to be elected 
President of Venezuela in 1998 in accordance with the constitution of the day. The 
Chavez of 1998 was a man in the right place at the right time. His campaign 
appealed to millions of Venezuelans who were tired of having their voices and 
needs ignored. In the decade since his election, Chavez has berome a politician 
and set Venezuela on a decidedly different democratic path. 
Along the way Chavez has garnered many opponents. They come from 
other political parties, the military, the private sector, trade un..ions and the 
Church. He has also made no secret of his dislike for the United States (US). 
Recently, along with President Evo Morales of Bolivia, the CMvez government 
expelled the US Ambassador to Venezuela and recalled their own ambassador 
over allegations of US meddling in the politics of the region. As the US has made 
a hobby of insinuating itself into the politics of the region in the past, CMvez's 
acwsations may not be without meriV It was rumoured that, when Chavez's 
opponents sought to plan an overthrow in 2002. a small group of individuals 
Nmade a pilgrimageN to Washington. DC for the purpose of NgaUging White 
House support" for a plan 10 oust the Venezuelan president (McCaughan 2004, 
85). There is no finn indication that White House officials agreed to provide 
support to this group. At the time the White House was preoccupied with the WIl'r 
ChAvez also maintains his share of friends. He continues to enjoy the 
support of a majority of Venezuelan~. He maintains dose ties with the leaders of 
Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador and Nicaragua among others. To the dismay of the 
western world he has also visited President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in [ran and, 
as recently as November 2008, Venezuela hosted a portion of the Russian navy for 
exercises off the roast while eM.vez played host to Russian President Dmitrii 
Medvedev.' Like many politi(a! leaders CMvez has also promoted and appointed 
friends and supporters to influential positions within the military, the 
government and the judiciary. This insulates and protects CMvez from 
opposition white helping him further the Bo!ivarian Revolution in Venezuela. His 
friendships with other Latin American leaders bolsters Oti\vez's image in the 
region, fosters anti-Ameri<:anism and promotes economic ties. His colourful 
relations abroad give Cllavez an international political platform while allowing 
him to voice his disdain for the US among likemiruled world leaders. 
If Cllavez is not, all some observers claim.. an ego maniacal dictatO<' 
determined to dl'Stroy Venezuelan democracy, who is he? Is he an elected uudillo 
as defined in the Introduction of this thesis? Or, does he ~I $OIneother 
political manifestation? And, does Vene1.uela maintain some sort of democracy or 
has il already descended into dictatorship? The questions of electoral uudillismo 
and democracy are those that this chapter will ~k to address. 
Chavez emerged Into politics - a man with no party. He gained significant 
notoriety due to his involvement in the first of two failed military coups in 1992. 
From his prisoo cell CMvez urged eligible voters to abstain from voting in the 
December 1993 election. Approximately 40 percent of the voting public obliged 
and stayed at home (McCaughan 2004, 43). As part of a series of elLoction promises 
made by the new president, the original 1992 coup leaders were freed.' While the 
new government proved to be as inept as its predecessors and with economic 
crisis ever present, Olavez quietly planned his political future. Along with a 
growing number of supporters Olavez began to organize the basis for his first 
legitimate presidential campaign. Because he had no previous political party 
affiliation" OuIvez was forced to create a party. The MVR (Mouimiento QuilT/II 
RepubliOl) was bom from the remains of MRB (Muvimirnlo Revoluciollllrio 
BoUvarillno) 200 .. 
SinlX' his election in 1998, Chavez has won two presidential elections in 
2000 and 2006. TIle former was a type of re-election ilfrer the constitutional reform 
of the previous year.' In 1998 he won with 56.2 pem.'nt of the vote and in 2006 he 
won by 62.9 percent. These are both substantial victories. In addition to the 
constitutional referendum of 1999, there have been three other Significant 
referenda. The first was a Recall Referendum in response to the 2002 roup attempt 
and the subsequent national oil strike! The 2004 referendum queried whether 
Chavez should remain in power to serve out his term in office. Again CMvez was 
victorious. 1he elections were monitored by various international observers. Few 
irregularities were found (Kyriolkou 2006, 1). The Recatl Referendum was closely 
watched by observers from both the Carter Center and from the Organization of 
American Slates (OAS). These groups found no issue(s) with endorsing the results 
(Gott2005,263). 
The first referendum concerning a constitutional amendment to abolish 
presidential term limits was held in December 2007. Chavez's aspirations of 
governing for life were quashed by a margin of 51 percent to 49 percent against. A 
second referendum on this same issue was held in February 2009. This 
referendum was held while Clavez's popularily remained high and before oil 
prices began to plununet. At this point a decrease in oil revenues had yet to 
compromise the country's wealth or the programs that Clavez enacted to help 
Venezuelans. Clavez emerged victorious with appl'OJ(imately 54.85 percent of 
voters siding with the president.1 
When he was elected in 1998 Clavez vowed to represent the poor, dissolve 
the National Congress, convene a Constituent Assembly, eradicate corruption and 
redistribute the nation's wealth in a more equitable fashion (Tarver and Frederick 
2005, 151). Within a year the government unveiled the Bolivarian Constitution' by 
which Chavez would govern. Some e>:perts oontend that this version of the 
constitution is socialist, in line with Clavez's intent to pursue socialism rather 
than neo-liberalism as his style of government (\Vilpert 2fX!l, 3).IO CMvez himself 
has spokeo out against the nro-liberal style of government and he has spoken 
often in favour of socialism but this initial constitutional change was designed to 
allow the new president an opportunity to govern as he saw fit. 
11lc 1999 cunstitution brought sweeping changes which (urthercentralized 
the government and concentrated more power in the hands of the president. 
Under the lIl!w constitution the president is permitted to hold office for six years 
rather than five and to sit for two consecutive terms. In addition, the power of 
both the government and the miHtary were enhanced and the structure of 
government was made unicameral as the senate was abolished in favour of a 
National Assembly (Tumer 2005, 1998). The president was also given the power 
to veto congressional biHs while the congress was in tum empowered to override 
presidential wtoes. In November the National Assembly approved the Uy 
HrlbiJitanle or the ~E.nabling lawN which allowed Chavez to legislate by decree on 
matters relating 10 the economy, social issues and issues related to public 
administration for one year (Timeline: Vl'Ilezuela, 28 November 2(06)." Such a law 
undennines the natural checks and balances of government and effectively 
negates the role of the National Assembly. It also emphasizes the loyalty of the 
coalition to the leader and the discipline neressary to allow him to govern at will. 
Like many of his predecessol"!:l throughout the region,. Chavez sought to 
placate the military in an attempt to render them less problematic. During his f1l"!:lt 
years in office OuIvez appointed a number of high ranking military officials to 
lead important government ministries induding posts in (ustice and defense. The 
same sort of individuals took up high level positions in government controlled 
indw;tries (Corrales 2002" 3(0). Plan Bolivar 2000 gaw the military a direct role in 
developing Venezuela." The plan put members of the armed forteS to work 
building houses and schools, distributing food. and providing other public 
services (Ottaway 2003, 85). There were complaints from the opposition parties 
and other opponents of the president that the military were too deeply involved 
in previously dvilian undertakings. 
In 2004 Ch.!I.vez created an ·'army" of urban reservists to complement the 
regular armed forces (Corrales 2006, 34). As the prlosidcnt planned to expand this 
group to two million members, theorists claim that this is a peTSOnal army to 
ensure that Qlilvez maintains power indefinitely. During the same period Chilvez 
gamed control of the National Electoral Council (NEC) giving him ucommand" of 
the agency which governs elections in Venezuela (Corrales 2006, 34). Laws were 
also revised to permit state supervision of the media content and fadlitate the 
imprisonment of uany citizen showing disrespect for government offkialsN 
(Corrales, 2006, 34). In addition to these revisions, the government admitted that 
citizens who signed the petition demanding the 2004 Recall Referendum could be 
observed for loyalty or op[X>Sition to the government. The state's ability to 
supervise media content through new communications laws and the president's 
control of Petr61rws de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA) through his many personal 
appointments were harbingers of the nationalisations that foUowed in the ensuing 
years. 
With his term in office assured by the Recall Referendum Ch.i\vez 
continued 10 accumulate power. His opponents were, at least temporarily, held at 
bay by Ch.i\vez's popularity, by his ability 10 fund numerous social programs with 
increasing petrodollars and the simple lact that individuals who were loyal to the 
president held virtually every important office, public or private, in the country. 
In the latter hall of 2005 he initiated a program of land expropriation. Huge tracts 
of private land were taken over by the state with the assistance of local governors 
and the National Guard (Corrales 2006, 37). Ostensibly this land was for 
redistribution to Venezuela's poor so that they may become self sufficient. 
However, observers claim that the land was for redistribution to Ch.i\vez loyalists. 
Ch.i\vez was even further emboldened by his 2006 re--election. Buoyed by a 
Significant election majority and increasing oil revenues Chavez pushed forward 
with an ambitious political agenda. Within two weeks of his re-election he 
announced the creation of the "most democratic party in Venezuela", the Partido 
SociaI.ista Unido rk Vrnall(/;z (PSUV), which was desigm!d 10 unify all of his 
supporters (Wilpert 2007, 219).1.1 Chavez expected, but did not order, thai aU 
members of the MVR and his other coalition party members would leave their 
own organizations and join his newly funned party. He allowed nine months for 
supporters 10 make their decisions. Those who refused to join the PSUV or left the 
coalition were to be treated as uoowards and oounlerrevolutionaries~ (Wilpert 
2007,220). 
At the end of JanuaJ)' 2007 Ch;i\'ez requested thai the National Assembly 
grant him the ability to rule by decree for a pomod of eighteen months ending in 
July 2008. There was no issue with the granting of this second Ley HabiUtollw as 
the National Assembly was stacked with Chave.,; supporters obliged to furnish 
the president with the power that he desired." 1be ability to rule by decree 
allowed Chavez to move forward with his bold post-election plans. The most 
ambitious plan was to nationalize substantial portions of the petroleum. energy 
and telecommunications sectors. As the state already enjoyed administrative 
mntrol of PDVSA, the nationalimtion legislation merely finalized the existing 
arrangement." After the OOIllpany was nationalized, PDVSA purchased more 
than eight per ren t of Electricidad de Cllracss, one of the largest suppliers of 
electricity. The nationalimtion wave included all of the other regional electriclty 
mmpanies(Wilpert2007,222). 
Nationali7.ation in the telecommunications sector mainly affected Cvmpllnia 
An6nima NacionaJ dt Teliplwnll5 dt Vtnelue!a (CANTY) which was owned in part 
by the US based Verizon (Wilpert 2007, 221). Control of CAI'ITV alone gave the 
state a significant inroad in the industry. [n the Spring 2008 the state went on to 
nationalize CEMEX an international cement manufacturing company and SIDOR 
a steel company with investors in Europe and South America. The lalit among the 
changes set out by OuIveZ s poot election plan ocrurred when the state declined 
to renew the broadcast license of Radio Caracas Tdroisi6n (RCfV)." In the past 
RCfV attacked OuIvez for perceived violations of political and civil rights (Faria 
2008,531). The company was also considered 10 be complicit in the 2002 oil strike. 
This post electioo plan was altered in November 2008 when, in response 10 falling 
oil prices and international economic turmoil, the government sought 10 
nationalize gold mining interests. 
At this juncture one may question the role, if any, of the opJXlSition in 
governing Venezuela. Since Chavez's initial election victory the political 
opJXlSition has struggled 10 find its voice. Generally, the parties make their 
opposition known through the media but they arc powerless 10 slop the president 
(Ma[inarich 2006). The government and the official opposition do not 
communicate directly and this behaviour severely hamper!l any ability 10 keep the 
government in check. In 2OO5lhe opposition parties boycotted the National 
Assembly elections thus providing Chavez with an even greater majority while 
depriving theoppooition of a stage for its own policies. Fortunatcly, for the 2006 
presidential elections opposition parties did field candidates who campaigned. 
voiced their concerns and set out specific platforms. 
Thus far this chapter has detailed Hugo CMvez's time in office in an 
attempt to discover the sort of leader that Venezuelans have permitted to retain 
office (or the past decade. Journalistic and scholarly opinion casts him as an 
authoritarian dictator bent on the destruction of Venezuelan democracy. From the 
beginning of his first eJectoral campaign Chlvez has marketed himself as the 
successor of Simon Bolivar (McCaughan 2004. 8). A5 Bolivar aspired to free Latin 
America from the yoke of Spain. Ch.ivez aims to free Venezuela from its past. 
This means replacing the old political system with something new and including 
more than the political elites in the politic!! of the country. Bolivar advocated for 
"liberty and equalityH with a strong government designed around a lifetime 
president (lynch 2006, 284). Certainly, in eighteenth century Latin America, 
Bolivar did not intend for a president to stand for a modem democratic election. 
Chavez depends on his personal charisma to endear himself to the 
population. He deliberately set out to cast himself as a larger than life character 
who fIXes the problems of Venezuelan .'Kldety. Observers even daim thai he has 
cast himself as a modem day Robin Hood with a touch of "anti·American, anti-
neoliberalist rhetoric" (Corrales 2006, 33). From the oul!let of the Chavez era 
voters have been less interested in Nvoting for representatives - people want 
Chave;z; and power to e/ puth/ON (Gunson 2006, 60). The president can maintain 
this phenomenon as long as he continues to encourage a grassroots-!>tyle 
revolution. give individuals an increased say in their communities, addl'e56O!S 
issues conccrning the marginalized sections of the population and as long as he 
has the funding for new and continuing social programs that address poverty and 
inequality. Of rourse, the Latter is almost entirely dependent on the fickle priCl.'!l of 
a non-renewable resource-oil. 
It cannot be denied that CMve;z; NWOfl power at the ballot bo"N and thai 
this makes him difficult tooppose in democratic terms (Corrales 2006, 33). His 
political activities have been within the dictiltes of the constitution. but the1"\' are 
those that would contend that this was ba1"\'ly the case. It cannot be denied that 
Chavez has concentrated power largely in his own hands. harassed and punished 
his opponents and members of the media. persecuted civicorganizatioru> and 
increased 5tate control of the economy (Corrales 2006, 33). On the surface this 
does appear to be an authoritarian style of government. However, his opponents 
are a live and are still able to pursue mearu> of ousting G .... e;z; from power. 'The 
past decade has shown that these individuals are not beyond operating outside 
the law to achieve their goal. Indeed the first coup in 2002 sought to depose a 
democratically elected president and replace him with a puppet representative of 
the old elites. Contrary to authoritarian stereotypes there are no camps or mass 
executions, no desapar«idos and civil society does exist (Corrales 2006, 34). " 
CMvel:'s detractors neglect the fact that Venezuelan politics wa~ a tidy 
democracy only beca1l!iC it was a case of democrllCia pactada or pacted politics.'" 
They also fail to note that this unique form of democracy is rarely, if ever, 
successful. There are those who claim that dmwcracia pactada is a weak. rigid form 
of democracy which is destined to collapse into political disarray because it is 
incapable of keeping pace with ever changing public demand. ThU5, for four 
decades Venezuelan politics appeared to be peaceful and politically trouble·free 
while, all along it was led by a small group ofVenewelan political elites who 
governed by compromise and ignored the needs of the marginali2.ed until the 
economy was nearly destroyed." Suddenly Venezuelan democracy appears 
slightly less democratic. There was no single dictator and regular elections 
occurred but power was retaioed in the hands of the elites." 
lhe cascading economic crises that began in 1980s, the staggering 
international debt, multiple attemp15 at structural adjustment, the drastic decrease 
in the standard of living of the majority of Venezuelans and ongoing accusations 
of political corruption were the obvious reasons for Venezuelans to demand 
change in the way that their nation was govemed. As soon as he announced that 
his first priority was to revamp the political system and began to rail to the public 
about the evils of nco-liberalism, which was perceived to have caused many of 
Venezuela's economic woes, Chavez virtually assured his election and continued 
time in office. After aU it was th<! nco-liberalist policiC5 of the previous 
administrations that were perceived to have caused the economic catastrophe. 
The failure of structure and the success of ag('ncy allowed Chavez attain 
political power and to retain it. Certainly, by westen'! standards.. V('nezu('ia 
possesst'd all of th(' necessary StructurC5 fora successfuldernocracy. There were 
well established government institutions and agencies, longstanding political 
parties.. a stable constitution, and a functioning legal system. However, many of 
these structures wet"(' badly comprornisOO or r=dered useless by the d~mrx:rllCia 
padadn. Class dissatisfaction and inequality and the rise of civil soci('ty in the 
1990s left Venezuela ripe for Chavez's Bolivarian Revolution. 
Weak or non--existent structures provide an opportunity for agency to 
thrive. Chavez would be the agent. It should not be forgotten that he enjoyed 
notoriety as a go/pisla and managed to sway an election while still in pri:lon. The 
democracia pactilda left Venezuelan government unable and unwilling to respond 
to the needs and demands of average citi7,.ens. They required a leader with no 
loyalty or ties to existing political parties or government around which they could 
rally. Chavez was the individual with the necessary qualifications when the time 
came to revolutioni7-c Venezuelan politics. His popularity rontinues to allow him 
to consolidate power and to establish a government and a country in acrordance 
with his own aims. 
Two overardting questions remain: is Hugo Chavez an elected Ci/udilw and 
is Venezuela a delegative democracy? The basic answer to the first question is 
Nyes~ Chavez is an elected cuudillo. He does not, however, embody all of the 
negative characteristics of elected C4udillismlJ that Oose intended when he defined 
this ronrept in tel'JIllj of Nicaragua's Arnoldo Aleman. Despite claims by Chavez's 
detractors that he is evil iI/Camille with an agenda to set Venezuela up as a 
dictatorship, he is not an elected cuudillo in the Aleman-sense of the tcnn. Chavez 
claims to be genuinely interested in building a strongeT Venezuela within a 
democratic framework. Voters freely admit to electing Chavez - the man, to the 
presidency in 1998 
Venezuela, like most of Latin America, has a strong history of personalistic 
leaders. Chavez governs Venezuela in acrordance with his personal beliefs and 
ambitions in the spirit of Bolivar. His opponents contend that Bolivar's leadership 
style was Nbest suited to military dictatorsN , but even Ot;ivez found himself 
without full military support during the brief 2002 roup (Lynch 2006, 3(4). He has 
left his personal military involvement behind while removing those he trusts 
from the armed forces and placing them in alternate civilian positions. Even this 
is nothing more than any other leader would do - place his loyal sup!X>rters in 
positions of power. 
The question of whether Venezuela is a delegative democra<y is a more 
romplicated one. When CYDonneIl set the definition of delegativc democracy he 
indicated that this fonn of democra<y was a step on the path to successful liberal 
democra<y.ltcannolbedeniedthatVenezuelaalreadyhasasuccessful 
democracy despite the pact and the many crises of !he past twenty years. 
However, if one reads CYDonnell's definition closely it states that delegalive 
democra<y is an instance where voters elect a president " .. . to govern as he (or 
she) thinks best ... " (CYDonnelll994, 56). TItis is what Venezuelans have done by 
electing Ch.ivez. They have chosen a president 10 govern in accordance with his 
own beliefs and aspirations for the nation. In this way, in the case of Venezuela,. 
perhaps delegative democracy is not a step on the democratic path but rather a set 
of circumstances which causes an electorate 10 choose a personalislic leader 
because they believe that he alone.is the individual best suited to govern the 
nation. Right now in Venezuela. delegati"e democracy is a choire within 
democracy and no! a step along the way to democracy. 
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ChapterTwo 
Unlike Venezuela, Russia has never been touted as the poster child for 
democracy in any region. Indeed, Russia has fewer than twenty years at 
democratic tradition. In that time there have been thn-e presidents and numerous 
prime ministers. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has held both posts. He was 
handpicked to assume the presidency by an ailing President Boris Yeltsin less 
than six months after taking over the prime minister's office. ' A decade later 
observers contend that Russia is distinctly less democratic under the guidance of 
the former president and current Prime Minister Putin than it had been since the 
end of communist ro le. Such observers point to Putin as the maestro of a 
resurgence in authoritarian-style government in Russia. 
Of the thn-e leadcra examined in this thesis, Vladimir Putin is the only one 
who does not currently hold the top position of !Xlwer in his country. In 
acrordance with the Russian rorultitution, Putin prepared to leave the president's 
office at the 2008 elections after serving for two consecutive terms. He quid:ly 
announced his candidacy for the prime minister's post. As expected, his 
handpicked SUCl'e6SOr, Dmitril Anatolevich Medvedev, was promptly elected 
president.' Rumblings followed this skilfu lly crafted change in power that suggest 
that Putin, in his quest to retain his hard won power over Russia. quietly 
transferred a bloc:k of presidential powers to the prime minister's office. 
There are two sets of questions that this chaprer will not discuss. One is the 
potential power struggle between Putin and Medvedev. The second is a series of 
events including the oonflict in Chechnya. the Kursk, the Dubrovka Theatre, 
Beslan Of Russia's deteriorating relations with the West. Events such as these 
could have befallen any Russian president and, for that matter, they ('()Uld have 
happened to anyone of a number of world leaders. The emphasis here is Of! the 
type of president that Putin was and the type of democracy that this!jOrt of 
leadership fashioned in Russia 
Acoording to the Russian public, Putin was It remarkably popular 
president. Data indicates that, during hlstirne in office, hi!Japproval rating never 
dipped below 65 percent and usually ranged between 70 and 80 percent 
(Goldman 2008, 201). Putinowed at least a portion of this rampant popularity to 
the fact that he followed Boris Yeltsin into office. During Yeltsin's tenure Russians 
endured eight years of an inflrm, erratic and often drunken president. When 
Putin took office as a young. sober and healthy individua~ with a "busil\eS5'likew 
manner, he was an immediate improvement (Lucas 2008, 8). Putin's nationalism 
and his intense desire to return Russia to her superpower status addressed the 
embarrassment of many Russians over just how far the country had fallen. This 
was an embarrassment that Putin very likely shared with his fellow Russians. 
Although average Russians seemed to support Putin, he had many 
detractors. His main opponents were concentrated in the media, the oligarchy 
and the private sector} His dealings with intl.'1'I1a1 opponents will be addressed 
later in this chapter. His relationships with the United States (US), Europe and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members were both positive and 
negative. Relations between Russia and the US remained tainted by the cold war 
and, despite Russia's post·Soviet evolution, an air of suspicion remained 
regardless of Putin's generally cordial relations with former President Coorge W. 
Bush, His support of the US war on terror furnished Putin with a plausible reason 
to direct his military campaign in Chechnya as he claimed to be fighting terrorism 
because Olechen Islamic groups were providing assistance to various rebel 
groups(Servie<>2003,544). 
Putin's relationship with NATO was also both genial and contentious. In 
the early days of his presidency Putin was rumoured to have considered allowing 
Russia to join NATO (Black 2004, 32). Albeit short-lived. this notion prompted 
Putin to spend much of the rest of his time in office engaged in railing against 
some NATO action or policy. An exampte of this particularly contentious issue 
was Georgia's intention to;oin NATO (Traub 2008, 4).' Over time, Putin 
suspended arms oontrol agreements, dispatched military planes into NATO 
airspace, and threatened to aim missiles at Europe (Lucas 2008, 10). 
As Putin worked to reclaim Russia's place on the international stage 
Western accounts of his presidency became increasingly negative. He became an 
enemy of democracy. It is this image which inspired rutin's portrayal as a typical 
authoritarian leader who paid little more than lip service to the notion of 
democracy. Y!!t as suggested by Stuenner, he might also be viewed simply as a 
nationalist leader who manipulated individuals and government in old!!f to 
restore Russia to its former glory (Stuermer 2008,17). Perhaps, as Shevtsova 
SUg&'Sts, hi! was a bureaucratic authoritarian (Shevtsova 2005, 323).' Or, perhaps, 
he too was an elected caudillo as defined by Close. One of the purposes of this 
thesis is to generalize Latin American theory with rclerence to a different 
geographical and political context such as rutin's Russia. As was the case with 
Venezuela, the question regarding what sort of democracy, ifany, exisled in 
Russia during Putin's tenure as president and wheth!!r that form of democracy 
was actually delegative democracy must also be addressed. 
Like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Putin emerged onto Russia's national 
political scene as a man with no party who had n('Vcr been elected to public 
office. Though. unlike Chavez he was not the leader of a failed coup but rather a 
bureaucrat who reached the rank of lieutenant colonel with the Committeeof 
State Security (KGB).' His political involvement began when he joined the 
administrative staff of Mayor Anatoly Sobchak in Leningrad while still employed 
by the KGB. ' During this time he contradictorily claimed to nave resigned his 
post with the KGB and to have the agency's blessing on his new post as chairman 
of St. Petersburg's Foreign Relations Committee (Truseott 2004, 68). As it was 
extremely unlikely that anyone was actually allowed to resign from the KGB, it is 
more likely that the country and the agency were in such a state of disarray that 
rutin's career change was relatively unimportant. 
Putin was appointed finit deputy mayor under Sobchak in 1994 and ran 
Sobchak's unsuccessful re-election campaign in 19%. After the campaign he 
found h~lf unemployed. Later that same year rutin went to Moscow where he 
was offered a position in the Legal Department of the president's General Affairs 
Office. It is generally accepted among observers that Vladimir Yakovlev, the new 
Governor of 51. Petersburg and dose friend of the Yeltsin family, wanted Putin 
out ofhis city and lobbied his many political friends to find rutin a fob (TrusroIt 
2004, SI).' Two years later, in 1998, Putincame to the attention of members of 
Yeltsin's administrative staff. He first became Deputy Head of Management in the 
president's administration and in Juiy 1998 was appointed Head of the FedeTai 
SecurityServire(FSB).· 
Yeltsin wa~ imp~ with Potin's Nabllity to get the job done~ and by his 
loyalty (Riasanovsky 2005, 626). The latter would prove vital to Yeltsln if he and 
his family members were to obtain. immunity from p~tion under a new 
administration. In August 1999 Potin was appointed prime minister and the 
Yellsin =p began regularly to poU Russians on his popularity (Truscott 2004, 
111).IOClearly the plan for Potin's future was sel. It was rumoured that Yeltsln 
first discussed the handoverof power with Pulin as late as mid-L\.ocember 1999 
with the final agreement settled on 29 Derember (Truscott 2004,. 119). Just two 
days later,on New Year's Eve, Putin wasappomted Russia's second president." 
As expected. Putin promptly issued his first decree granting Yeltsin immunity 
from any wrongdoing during hi!! time in office and "'absolving~ all aides of any 
wrongdoing as they were under Yelstin's direction (Shevtsova 2005, 69).11 The 
former president's gamble on Punn's loyalty proved fruitful. 
Acoording to the 199Jconstitution. Putin had ninety days from his 
appointment to solidify a political base and stand in a presidential election. His 
other options entailed surrendering the post by not runnmg o r holding onto 
power by usurping the constitution. He did neither. Preparations for a March 
election began in earnest. Putin initially faced ten candidates in the 2000 
presidential election but by March all but a few had dropped out. Among those 
remaining were Vladimir Zhirinollsky (Liberal Democratic Party), Gennady 
Zyuganov (Communist Party) and Crigory YavHnsky (Yabloko Patty)." None of 
these men were political neophytes and, consequently, each brought his own 
political baggage to the election. By election time Putin's popularity had reached a 
very high level. His stance on the Second Chechen War made him "appear to be a 
strong. decisive leader'" (Shelltsova2005,70). 
Putin cultivated the S\Ipport of the Unity Party, which he supported in the 
December 1999 elections, winning the presidency with 53 percent of the vote 
crumer 2OCl8, 1(40)." His closest opponent. Zyuganov, received approximately 29 
percent of the vote. After the uncertainty of Yellsin's time in office Russians were 
apparentty ready for a change. Of course, having; been appointed by Yells;" gave 
Putin the competitille advantage. AI; acting president he had ready access to the 
instruments necessary to ensure his election. Moreoller, he did not halle to 
scramble for financial backing to support hi<; campaign. This meant that he owed 
the private sector "othing. And, he did not even need to create a party (Service 
2003,543). 
The Duma elections in December 2003 were a harbinger of things to rome. 
It was generally perceived that if United Russia failed to win, then Putin's 
position as a presidential candidate would be weakened (Shevtsova 2005, Z86). 
The incumbent had no reason for concern as United Russia won the Duma 
elections with slightly more than 37 percent of the vote over the Communist Party 
with approximately 12 percent (Shevtsova 2005, 288). Voter turnout was 55 
percent. Beyond alluding to the need to fight corruption and free Russia from the 
oligarchs, Putin did not campaign actively (Riasanovsky 2005, 629).'J His five 
opponents did their best to ron election campaigns but found themselves largely 
shut out from the mOOia with their rallies cancelled or raided. With just more than 
64 percent voter turnout Putin prevailed with 71 percent of the vote over Nikolay 
Kharitonov's nearly 14 percent (5hevtsova 2005, 3(2). Both the Duma and 
presidential elections were watched by official and unofficial observers. It was 
concluded that, overall, the elections were free but badly flawed. 
Russia is the most democratically challenged nation of the t:hrce countries 
presented in this thesis. Pulin, when compared to CMvez and Silvio Bcrlusroni. 
at least possessed policy and govemment experience from his time with the seeret 
service and in both the Sobchak and the Yeltsin administrations. With his 
obligation to Yeltsin successfully discharged and an election victory in hand Putin 
moved on to the business of revitalizing Russia. Professionally he knew that the 
key to succeeding at this task was a strong stale (fruscolt 2004, 124). He quickly 
set about to restructure both the legislative regions and the Federation Council. 
Both of these objectives were strategically designed to address Putin's election 
promise to decrease corruption. \'/hat resulted was the centralization of power 
and an increased control over local governments. 
In an effort to address what Putin perceived as wcompetition for power 
between the centrl! and the state~ and to "reassert constitutional authority~ 
Russia'seighty-nine legislative regions were restructured (Sakwa 2008, 193-194). 
The result was seven larger administrative districts. \'/here federal leaden were 
elected posts, each new district was represented by an individual appoi.nted by 
and loyal to Putin. Most appointees had either military or security backgrounds 
(fumer 2008, 1040)." Individuals loyal to the president would follow his 
directives. The 1999 Dumae1ections insured thai Putin had the full support of the 
lower house of the Russian Federal Assembly. In order to assure similar support 
from the upper house, the Federation Council, elected members were replaced 
with appointees from the regional governors as approved by the Kremlin 
(Felshtinsky and Pribylovsky 2008, 173). Thus, the Federation Coundllost its 
independence entirely. 
While Putin enjoyed substantial support in the Duma,. he did not have a 
majority until April 2001. That is when the Unity Party merged with the 
Fatherland bloc. The latter was oontrolJed by former Yeltsin Prime Minister 
Yevgeny Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yury Lu7.hkov. The merger was, of 
course, orchestr.l.led by the Kremlin to provide Putin with greater control in the 
Duma (Shevtsova 2005, 181). It sucreeded because of Putin's extreme popularity 
and the fact that il was already dear to the more astute Russian politicians thai it 
was unwise 10 go against the president when such an offer was made. 1he 
resulting party, United Russia, gave Putin 132 seats of the 226 seat simple 
majority (fumer 2008, 1041). A oorresponding party was also fonned in the 
Federation Council. 
Aside from providing Putin with control of the Duma. the party merger 
effectively reduced the number of opposition parties, limiting the number of 
politicians positioned to speak oul against the president or against Kremlin 
policies. Fewer parties translated into fewer "vehicles for personal ego building 
and petty feudsH as Putin once described political parties (Goldman 2008, 171). A 
number of the oligarchs tru.t l'utin would eventually target provided substantial 
financial backing toopposition parties. 
Among themultitudeofchanges undertaken in 2001 Wi15 a reinvigoratcd 
attempt to reform the judicial system. Yeltsin's attempts at reform in 1990s failed 
and rutin intended to be successfuL He envisioned a legal system that Wi15 more 
effective and "just~ while being responsive to the aims of the president (froscott 
2004, 208). An independent judiciary was not an option. Corruption was 
considered rampant in the legal system with the prosecutor's office being ~among 
the most nawed~ (Lucas 2008, 73). This office had the right to investigate and 
imprison whomever it chose without credible evidence or, for that matter, any 
evidence at all. rutin's reforms included: increased status, mmpert.'l3tion and 
accountability for judges, more oourts, more funding for the court system. the 
creation of Justices of the Peace, the development of a trial by jury system aod set 
the time for pre-trial detention to one year (fruscotl 2004, 208). The Constitutional 
Court was also granted the power to ensure that court decisions were upheld. 
Finally, in an attempt to balance the power of the prosecutor's office, defence 
lawyers were granted more rights during trials. 
Next rutin turned his attention to the army. Strengthening the Russian 
military Wi15 one part of restoring Russia's might. Putin inherited a military in 
desperate need of attention and reform. Events in Chedmya were barely under 
mntrol (Lucas 2008, 5). 1ltere were numerous reports of the abuse of recruitll at 
the hands of their military superiors, lack of food and basic suppli('5, lack of 
equipment, high desertion rates and far above average suicide rates. lhe 
equipment was decrepit and the training lacklustre. According to Anna 
Politkovskaya the army was Na prison where no one gets in unless !IOIlleone 
wants them and once in they are slaves forever" (politkovskaya 2004,. 1). In the 
state that it was, the military also provided individuals with fertile ground on 
which to take advantage of their rank and parlay their military service into a 
quick method of advancement into the political elite. This was the CiI!IC during the 
Chechenoonflict. 
Throughout the second oonf1ict in Chedmya the military was given 
significant latitude (Sakwa 2008, 76). Putin expected success. Hence, the 
government paid more attention to the military. Betwren 2000 and 2006 Russia 
increased military spending by 3.5 percent or approximately USD$30 billion 
(Sakwa 2(X)8, 77)." New policies related to abolishing conscription, addressing 
abuse and creating a more professional organization were developed as part of 
military reform. As part of this design, in 2006, rutin established six objectives for 
the military to achiev(.' over the next decad(.'. The new objectives induded: Russian 
forres should studyoompeting forces in order to develop superior responses; 
living conditions for officers and soldiers were to be improved and one half of the 
military budget would be devoted to increased training.. better equipment and 
"technical advancement'" (Stuermer 2008, 1(3). Notably, no plan was devised to 
ensure that these objectives were met. 
No leader runs a (."OUfItry entirely alone and Putin was no exception. As a 
role leaders surround themselves with individuals that they feel that they can 
trust. However, Putin inherited his first cabinet and it lOok some time to replace 
illl members with his own trusted cadre. Slowly and steadily the siluvW assumed 
top posts in the government related state agencies and the military. " Some of 
them also made their way inlo the upper echelons of industry and the media. 
Acoording to Puti", industries that were controlled by the oligarchy should 
function in Russia's national interest and noI service the personal greed of their 
owners. Such industries, mostly related 10 the energy sector, were to be reclaimed 
and rrorganiud ostensibly to ensure their competitiveness with their western 
counterparts (Lucas 2008, 97).1his was part of the president's bid 10 reclaim some 
of Russia's economic influence. By 2008 state owned companies were staffed by 
"likeminded individuals~ who would obey Putin's directives (Goldman 2008, 99). 
[n July 2OJO Putin reportedly gathered approximately two dozen of 
Russia's leading oligarchs at the Kremlin. The attendees were informed that if 
they did not involve themselves in the politics of the nation then the state would 
not interfere in their business dealings (Goldman 2008, 102). By that time Viktor 
Chemomyrdin" the OIairman of Gazprom and Vladimir Gusinsky, the head of 
Media-Most had already been removed (rom their posts. Gusinsky was jailed for 
his network's criticism of the govemment's handling of the Chechen conflict and 
various "undemocratic practi(('S~ (Riasanovsky 2005, 629). Boris Berezovsky and 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky ignored the advice. Berezovsky had been an ally of both 
Yeltsin and l'utin. He became an outspoken critic of Pulin and attempted 10 
organize his OWTI political party while funding various human rights groups 
(RJasanovsky 2005, 629). Before the end of that year, after threat of imprisonment, 
Berewvsky surrendered control of his oil company, 5ibneft, and fled 10 England." 
Khodorkovsky began an 8 year prison sentence in 2005. 
In 2001 Rem Vyakhirev was removed as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
Gazprom. The following year Viktor Gerashdtenko was removed from his post as 
chainnan of the Russian Central Bank. The removal of Chemomyrdin, Vyal<hircv 
and Gerashdtenko were touted as an attempt to "halt banditry" and stop what 
rutin perceived as gross mismanagement and Npillaging" of the state (Goldman 
2008, 104). Gusinsky, Bcrezovsky and Khodorkovsky either pilloried Putin in the 
media, supported his opponents finandaUy or attempted to start their own 
political parties (or some combination of these offences). lheir harassment at the 
hands of Putin could be interpreted as revenge for what the president perceived 
as a lack of respect towards him or as a desire to eliminate opponent!;. 
The persecution and prosecution of Khodorkovsky was, at least in part.. 
tied to his company~ Yukos.'"' After Khooorkovsky failed to heed the president's 
warn.ing in 2000 Yukos became financially stronger and its owner became bolder. 
When Khooorkovsky negotiated an agreement with China that would establish a 
pipeline between the two nations Putin accused him of Nnegotiating foreign 
policyw which was, of OOUI"$C, exclusively the state's jurisdiction (Goldman 2008, 
111). This misstep, interpreted within the purview of Putin's quest to gamer 
control of the energy sector, led to Khodorkovsky's arrest in 2003. The charges 
against him included: tax evasion,. grand theft, fraud, forgery, embezzl<'ffieflt and 
extortion. The company was found to owe approximately USD$33 billioro in taxes 
(Goldman2OO8,120). 
As a oonsequence, the state took control of Yukos. When Putin took office 
the state oontrolled 16 perrent of crude oil proouction. Seven years Later it 
controlled 50 percent (Goldman 2008, 99). Similar takeovers and the acquisition of 
oil stocks p rovided substantial revenUefi to fund new programs and modem 
nation building. For the period from Putin's election in 2000 through most of 2003 
oil revenues fuelled increased personal incomes, paid foreign Joallll, increased 
investment in manufacturing. decreased flight of capital and ensured the timely 
payment of wages (Riasanovsky 2005, 630). Interestingly, it wru; also found that 
several members of Putin'8 government held positions in the private sector and 
many of these were with energy companies. 
Putin's effective muzzling of the oligarchs was extended to the media. 
After the 2000 presidential election Putin unveiled a new press policy. He decreed 
that, while he ''believed in the principle of free press~, the state would not permit 
the media to become a source of udisinformation" or a tool for anti-state entities 
(Riasanovsky 2005, 630). Both Gusinsky and Berezovsky were private media 
owners of television networks. newspapers and magarines, who began as rutin 
supporters but quickly became outspoken opponents. Gusinsky was compelled 10 
forfeit his media holdings 10 Gazprom. causing the television journalists to ~f1ee~ 
10 Berezovsky's TV -6 until it too was forced from the air in 2002 (Ria.sanovsky 
2005, 630). Journalists had to learn 10 censor themselves in order 10 survive, thus 
contributing 10 a growing lack of media diversity. Soon the state's message 
became the only message, as little controversial news reached the public. The 
opposition parties had 00 voice because they had virtually no access 10 media 
outlets. 
This was rutin's Russia. With so much power concentrated in the hands of 
the president and the statl!, many western observers anticipated that rutin would 
remain in office by ignoring or overriding the constitutional term limit. Instead, 
he surprised many when he appointed a successor and pl'('p<lred to step down.1I 
As if to not disappoint expectations, Putin did not step far as he stood for the post 
of prime minister in the 2008 elections and won. This position allows him to 
maintain substantial popularity among Russians and, many contend, to continue 
to run the country. 
Ultimately Putin's leadership was born from a failure of structure and a 
flourishing of agency. rutin's ability to consolidate and grow his power base is an 
e:umple of failure of structure. Even nearly a deade after the collapse of 
communism,. Russia still possessed weak political institutions, underdeveloped 
social representation and an underdeveloped party system (Sakwa 2008, 90). The 
Russian constitution is written in a manner that fosters strong leaders and 
encourages centralized government. It offen insufficient checks and balances for 
those in power. Both a vigorous opposition and a stronger civil society would 
assist in keeping both the president and the Kremlin in dIede. 
Agency usually thrives when structures are weak. This was the case with 
Putin. Much of this chapter has illustrated how rutin acrumulated strength. The 
weak structures facilitated the consolidation of power and allowed him to 
restructure the government,. the parties, a portion of the private sector and the 
legal sysll'm, ctc. in a fashion that suited his owns airns. "T1ilii strength of agency 
also lends to the response to another question: is Putin an elected C4J1dilw? Of 
coursoe he is. There can be no doubt that he governs Russia in accordance with his 
personal agenda. Fortunately for the Russian population this is in accordance 
with their longstanding penchant for strong personalist leaders (Sakwa 2008, 90). 
Even though Putin lacks Chavez's charisma. his detennination to 
strengthen Russia and redefine that nation's place in the world varied little from 
Chavez's plan for Venezuela. Putin's sense of nationalism caused him to stri~ to 
restore Russia's place in the world order. TIle sacrifice of democracy in Russia is 
an unfortuna te ''by-product~. However, Putin was never a proponent of western 
style democracy. 
The question of delegative democracy in Russia must take Putin's strength 
of leadership into account. Russians chose a strong leader and allowed him to 
govern in accordance with his vision for the nation. When Putin was elected in 
2000 Russians polled were 71 percent in favour of a strong leader and 13 perrent 
in favou r of democratic institutions (Shevtsova 2005, 73). fnitially, Russians chose 
l'utin because he appeared to be so far removed from the sort of leader that 
Yeltsin had beco. Their craving for stability allowed him to govern at wiU. 
However by his second tenn RUS!iians' attitudes toward democracy had begun to 
change. Twenty percent more of Russians polled wanted to "expand democracy 
among the public"', compared to the 2000 results, and ]5 perrent more wanted 
increased democratiultion (Shevt!lova2005,353). Ifthistn>nd oontinues, Russians 
and their president will find themselves at odds 
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At first glance Silvio Berlusconi appears to be the outlier among the leaders 
examined in this thesis. Few observers would question that he is a democratically 
elected leader or that Italy is a liberal democraq. Certainly Italy i5 not a 
struggling Latin American country like Venezuela or an underdeveloped 
democra"Y like Russia. However, while Berlusconi may not be an authoritarian 
leader he has been described as a ~na.rctssistic megalOmaniac" (Stille 2OCf7, 19). It 
is possible that, ultimately. this may prove to be the more dangerous type of 
leader to have. Berlusroni has served as Italy's prime minister on three occasions 
beginning in 1994. He was most recently elected with a substantial mandate in 
2008. He is also the only one of the leaders induded here to refuse to leave office 
after an election defeat.' 
Berlusroni does not possess Putin's civllservire background, nor does he 
share Chavez's military experience. He is an entrepreneur and media mogul 
turned politician and there are many who question his motivation for entering the 
political arena, as well as his ability to govern. The fact that he is a self-made 
multi-millionaire who appears to have endeared himself to voters who, at least 
initially, believed that Berlusconi's personal financial success would translate into 
economic prosperity for Italy. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. 
He first became prime minister at the advent of what was supposed to be a 
new era in Italian politics. The early 1990s in Italy saw substantial political 
upheaval in the wake of the mlln; pillitt (dean hands) enquiries. Thesecorruption 
investigations were launched by magistrates in Milan prior to the 1992 elections 
(McCarthy 1995, 2). As expected, it was found that corruption in the form of 
bribery and the ~auction of power and positionM were endemic and that the 
existing political system could barely survive without such elements (McCarthy 
1995, 2). It should be noh.>d that this was just one of many instances of political 
oorruption to be unoovered in Italy. 
The Milan magistrates issued a significant number of notices to appear 
before the investigation oommittee to many active and former politicians along 
with various private sector actors. Someof these individuals were tried and jailed. 
Two of the aC'CllllCd were closely tied to Berlusronl: his brother, Paolo, and his 
benclactor Bertino Craxi.' Several sources claim that Betlusooni's sole motivation 
for entering politics was to save himseU from incarreration becau9C, by late 1993, 
the magistrates were beginning to focus closely on the flagship of his empire -
Media5et($tille2007,l70).' 
Part of the dispersal of political favours was the accepted form of power 
sharing among the established ruling political parties. For years Venezuelan 
democracy was held hostage by the Pact of Punto Fijo. Italy had the Ma"uale 
Cencelli. This was a mathematical formula that calculated the distribution of public 
officesbasedoothe~t:lgeofthevoteattainedbypoliticalpartie5..Beca~thc 
Christian Democrats usually performed wel~ its meml::>o!n were usually appointed to the 
most coveted positions. Certain ministries were controlled by a particular party no 
matter what the election outcome while other government positions were subject 
to the rampant clientelism that existed in Italy during the post-war period.' This 
meant that from the end of the Serond World War until the early 1990sItaly 
"failed to secure a genuine alternation of govemment~ (Bull and Newell 2009, 42). 
During 1992 and 1993, Italian politics was ina state of crisis as an entire 
echelon of politicians and their p.1rties were swept from Italy's political map. The 
ensuing electoral reforms were designed to "encourage political parties to form 
allianC'l'S in order to facilitate elections~ (Shin and Agnew 2008, 3). 1"hl5 was 
supposed to foster two-party politics. It was in this weakened political party 
structure that Berlusconi created his party, FcmJI Itlllill, in November 1993 
(Ginsborg 2005, 65). The party was the label under which Berlusooni's brand of 
politics would be marketed to the Italian public. After all the party's name is 
based on the football chant NCo Jtaly!N, a catch phrase familiar to all Italians. 
Berlusroni offida.lly began his political career early in 1994 with a media 
blitz designed to assure victory in the upcoming March elections. He campaigned 
on a familiar platfonn of anti.-oommunism, anti-rorruption, economic 
liberalization, bureaucratic downsizing and reduction of government 
involvement in comll\Crce and industry crumer 2008, 705). There was not a single 
actual policy attached to any of these election promises. However, his appeal to a 
population exhausted by rorruption scandals and failed policies was substantial. 
There was a void created by the destruction of the traditional political parties. 
Berlusconi !!OUght to fill that void using every marketing ploy available. 
Politically, Ik!rlusconi allied FOrul Italill with the unlikely combination of 
the /...ega Nord (Northern League) and Alktll1Zil NaziolUlk (National Alliance) in a 
centre-right coalition called the Polo !kilt Libtrtil (Freedom Alliance). Despite the 
ideological disparity between these three parties the coalition won a majority of 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies. FOTZil ItQliII emerged with the largest share of 
the vote at 21 percent (Duggan 200'7, 586). Berlusconi was sworn in as prime 
minister in May of the same year. 
Allegations 01 rorruption and confl ict of interest against Berlusconibegan 
almost immediately. By November 1994 the Rdean hands· investigation targeted 
Berlusconi directly. Within a month the investigation into the prime minister's 
past business dealings caused the Northern League to withdraw its coalition 
support and led to a vote of non-ooofidence which aerlusconi lost. He was forced 
10 resign in the wake of scandal after just eight months in office. President Oscilr 
Scalfilro dl"Clined 10 call an election and insteild appointed the former treasury 
minister, Lamberto Oini, as prime minister. Eventually Berlusconi was found not 
guilty of the allegations thai ended his first tenure a prime minister. 
Berlusooni'scoalition lost the 1996 elections to L'U/ivo (OtivcTrce) 
coalition. There are three fiKtorll worth noting in this defeat. First the centre-left 
parties spent their time in opposition roorganizing and gaining political strength 
(Ginsborg 2005, 72). The result was the Olive Tree Coalition whose leader 
Romano Prodi was considered a credible =didate for the prime minister's post. 
Serond, Berluscon.i spent his time out of office oonsumed by anger and a sense of 
betrayal which prevented him from enlarging his coalition. rebuilding relations 
with the Northern league or developing a strong political platform from which to 
launch a successful campaign (Ginsborg 2005, 71). Toobservers this wasted 
energy and inactivity only further detailed Berlusconi's l<Kk of political expertise. 
Third, Umberto Bossi the leader of the Northern League chose to campaign 
outside Berlusroni's coalition for the 1996 election. As that party garnered just 
more than 10 pcrcent of the vote, this contributed to the centre-right coalition's 
1= 
Weak governing and poor policy implementation dogged the Olive Tree 
Coalition as the 2001 elections approached. The opposition mounted a vigorous 
campaign led with Berlu!K"Ql"li's trademark bluster. His command of the media 
and his personal wealth allowed the former prime minister to flood Italian 
households almost roruItantly with images and election rhetoric. He enjoyed 
substantial popularity across gender, class and geographic lines. This was 
something that previous leaders had been unabte to achieve. Also, the newly 
formed CIlS4 dellt Ubtrta (House of Freedom) coalition was created in 2(XXJ with 
the return to the fold of the Northern League.' 
With promises of increased urban security, judicial reform and a clamp 
down on illegal immigration. Bcrlusconi's coalition was returned to office 
(Ginsborg 2005, 94). There was just a sixty-five seat gain in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Bcrlusconi was returned to power with more than 45 percent of the vote 
and a majority in both houses (Ginsborg 2005, 96).' The expectations of Italians 
were high. The prime minister presented his campaign promllles in the form of a 
Hoontract with the Italian peopleH and when he was unable to fulfill that COIltract 
Berluscoru'spopularity suffered (Shin and Agnew 2008, 99). Of course, the 
inability to fulfill the contract was not entirely Bcrlu;;a:mi's fault. While he was 
distracted by further legal woes, there was both a domestic and a global eronomic 
downtum. 
In 2006 the House of Freedom coalition was defeated by L 'Ullio~ (The 
Union) coalition led by Romano Prodi! For three weeks Berlusroni refused to 
acknowledge the results of the election and remained in offiCI!:. The margin of 
victory was slim with Prodi's coalition garnering 49.8 perCl'flt of the vote over 
Berlusconi's coalition at 49.7 percent (Shin and Agnew 2008, 113). This translated 
into a loss by roughly twenty-five thousand votes. Prodi's government was to be 
short-lived.- The coalitioo fractured early in 2008. The Parliament was dissolved 
in February leading to an April election. The aIlianCl!: led by Berlusroni's Pupolo 
tIlUIl Lwlll (people of Freedom) 8eized power with nearly 47 perrent of the vote 
(Sassoon 20(8).' This was approximately 9 perCl'flt more than the centre-left 
alliance led by Walter Vel\roni. Thus, Berlusroni became prime minister for the 
third time. 
Unlike Chavez and Putin there are no questions relating to the 
disappearance of BerluSl'Oni's enemies, no changes to the constitution to allow for 
lifelong leadership, no outright atteInpts to block campaigning by the opposition.. 
no violence and no adversarial relations with the West. The questions regarding 
6erlusoonl's leadership are very different. Perhaps the biggest question targets his 
ability to lead and his motivation for doing !IO.Certainly such signifkantfinancial 
SUcces8 in the private sector does IlOt translate directly into political success but it 
does provide funding. Berlusroni's political mo tivation likely extends beyond his 
need for a career dlange or his desire to fere Italy from the corrupt political 
system of the mid 1990s. It is even possible that the critiCll who suggest that he ran 
for office to avoid jail are correct. 
Aside from the issues relating to Berlusroni's political motivation(s) there 
is speculation relating to exactly why he was elected. Some claim that it is due to 
his media monopoly but Berlusoonl cannot legally bar political opponents 
presenting themselves or their platforms in any form of the media." Certainly 
Berlusconi controls the majority of television media and a substantial portion of 
the print media in Italy but it is his business experience that provides him with his 
salesmanship, marketing savvy and experience in dealing with the public. In this 
way Berlusroni's business success contributes directly to his poli tical success. He 
also enjoys full access to Media5et, the staff who created and continues to market 
every aspect of F07'ZIIltlllill ilIl well as each electiOfl campaign. 
Bcrlusroni also emerged onto the Italian political scene just in time to fill 
the void Jeft in the early 1990s by the disintegration of the traditional political 
parties. To many he offered the only viable political alternative whose platform 
appealed to the public's sense of justice and future aspirations. Acrotding to one 
source he is u a magnet for those who are disinterested in national politics and 
who aTe com:emed with issues only related to their own advancem('t1tff (Shin and 
Agnew 2008, 2). Like Putin, Berlusroni began his political career as the acceptable 
alternative following a period of crisis 
While it may not be the sole rea!lOll for his election, Bcrlusconi's media 
interests certainly placed him in the public eye and, along with his previOlL'l real 
estate endeavours, provided him with the financial resources necessary for 
attaining and maintaining political office. He became involved in television in the 
early 1980s because he was attracted to the ffimmediacy" of television and he saw 
an opportunity to make unprecedented profit (Ginsborg ZOOS, 32). 
One must note that Berlusconi does not control or manipulate the media in 
the manner that Chavez or Putin have. Italian radio stations and newspapers arc 
not shut down or taken over without """planation and prominent joumalists are 
not found murdered in alleys or apartment stairweliB. Berlusroni simply bought 
up media rivals." When in govl'n1JJlerlt he did not embrace RDdiolt/evisioll( 
I1aJiana's (RAI) coverage so he ~pIaced its board of directors (StiUe 2007, 297).'1 
During his time in the prime minister's office a number of BerJusooni's friends 
and supporters have taken up positions at RAI and other rival mooia outlets. An 
interesting incident occurred when an ooitor for CQrri"e della Sera was eventually 
fired for hl<; unfavourable editorials l1'[ating to &rlusroni and his govemment. 
The prime minister used his influence to promise fmancial assistance to 
floundering Fiat if the editor was removed (Stille 2007, 295). Fiat's president was 
also on the board of the newspaper. 
The prime minister's influence and his business dealings caused a myriad 
of legal distractions during Berlusooni's time in office. Questions of influence 
peddling and conflicts of interest came to light prior to the 1994 election campaign 
and continue today. The accusations range from outright bribery to controlling 
the media to the extent that political rivals were unable to obtain adequate airtime 
or receive fair treatment in the press. Berlusooni claims thai he has endured "two 
thousand, five hundred hearings, nearly six hundred police interviews and spend 
almost one hundred and seventy-five million wro in legal fees" during his 
political career nX'r1usooni 'frred' ... w 2(08). 
Through all of this.. "enough" voters consider Berlusooni'slegal hardships 
relating to conflicts of interest, whct:her it is political or fmanoa\, to be "astuteru.!ss 
and good fortune~ which they hope will wrub off on the average citizen (Shin and 
Agnew 2(X)8, 2). Thus, when the government seeks to change laws or limit judicial 
power, a certain sector of the public perceives that these actions are for their 
benefit as much as for the prime minister's benefit. They do not consider 
Bcrlusconi'sself-scrvingmotivation. 
His legal travails led Berlusconi to seek todiscredlt magistrates and to 
change laws to either halt prosecution or to limit magisb!rial power. Almost since 
taking office Berlusroni has accused the Milan magistrates of pursuing a vendetta 
against him and his business associates." He refers to them regularly as "agL'Ots of 
the left" Qacques2009, 1)." lnitiaUy, in 1994,his time in office was insufficient to 
affect any sort of legislation to thwart the judiciary. However, in 2002 parliament 
passed new criminal reform legislation which critics claim was designed to help 
the prime minister avoid corruption charges (furner 2(X)8, 703). His 2003 
corruption trial was halted based on this legislation but when the same legislation 
was found by the courts to be void in 2004 the trial restarted (fumer2008. 703). 
Berlusconi was eventually acquitted lab!r that same year 
In 2003 Giullo Tremonti. the Minister for the Economy, created a new 
amnesty for tax evasion of which Mediaset took full advantage (Stille 2OC!7, 270) .... 
It was not until July 2(X)8 that hard fought immunity from prosecution laws took 
effect. These laws ~suspend all criminal cases against the prime minislft", 
president and heads of both chambers of parliament while they are in office" 
(hBerlusconi'frced' ... w 2008). Berlusroni is dearly more interested in protecting 
his personal business interests than he is in goveming Italy. Neither Ouivez nor 
Putin can be accused of being disinterested in state affairs. Berlusconi has. 
arguably, spent more time defending himself than he has governing Italy. 
Unfortunately for Italians, Berlusroru's Italy is not that dissimilar from 
Putin's Russia or Chivel"s Venel'ueJa in that a significant amount of power is 
concentrated in the hands of one man. How does this happen in an established 
liberal democracy? It is not difficult to achieve when literally "hundreds of 
members of parliament owed their positions directly" in some fashion to 
Berlusconi (Stille 2007, VO). These were largely individuals who once worked for 
him in some capacity in the private 8ector and who went on to run successfully 
for office or assumed appointments within govemment. These are not individuals 
who will side against their leader. This sort of loyalty coupled with Bertusconi's 
sheer wealth make it nearly impossible for him to be defeated because what he 
does not already control he can purcltase. 
There are two issues that are important with reference 10 Chivel' and Putin 
that hold much less significance for Berlusooni. These are constitutional change 
and relations with the West. As Italy is considered a western nation its 
government is expe<:ted to maintain cordial relations with other westem nations 
through organizations such as NATO, the European Union (EU) IlIld the Group of 
Eight industrialized nations (G8). Conflicts among these nations are expe<:ted but 
they are also expected to be solved quickly and in a civil fashion. 
Italy's current constitution was established in 1948. Berlusconi'scentre-
right coalitions have made no significant attempts to either rewrite or alter the 
oonstitution. (t seems that the prime minister is more focused on reworking 
judicial powers than he is insuring a life-long tcnn in office as was the case with 
Chavez. Two attempts at constitution~l refonn were made by Prodi's centre-left 
coalitions." Neither was successful. 
Like Olavez and rutin, Berlusconi's political successes are based in failure 
of structure and thriving agency. But structural failure in Italy is diff<'tenllhan 
that of Venezuela or Russia. Italy possesses the necessary structure to insure 
democracy. When Bcrlusconi entered politics the weakest structur~l oomponent 
were the political partil'S themselves. Oihcrwise, the constitution remained intact, 
there were no limitations on the existence or practice of political parties, there was 
no media censorship and, de8piteBeriusconi'sinterventions, the judiciary 
remains functional. Indccd Bcrlusconi'sexubcrant leadership style is kept in 
check not only by the opposition partie!! but also by the other parties which make 
up his own coalition government. Significant conflict within the coalition may 
threaten the prime minister's hold on power if he is unable to placate his fellow 
party leaders. Civil society, interest groups and political culture continue to thrive 
in Italy and contribute to structural intl'grity. 
Also like Ch.ivez and Putin, Bcrlusconi is an individual with impeccable 
timing. He is another example of agency thriving in the face 01 poor or weakened 
structure. Had the existing political parties, those that formed the so called ~First 
Republic", not bo..>en decimated by the corruptioro scandals and clean hands 
campaigN of the early 1990s Berlusconi would have had a less favourable 
opportunity to run for public office or to achieve a similar level 01 success. He 
already had sufficient govemment support and ties to various politicians to 
afford him the assistance that he required with any funding or issues of 
legislation that might arise. 
However, the "11111; pillite scandals provided a unique opportunity for 
Berlusconi to build on his already substantial political influence. There were 
viable alternative politicians with greater political expcrienre but Berlusconi 
became the most visible and most favoured among voters. Each of these three 
leaders was essentially the man in the right place at the right time. However, 
Ch.iI.vez spent more time and energy to adval'lCe his cause. He was willing to 
mount a military roup and endure prison. Putin accepted Yeltsin's offer to 
become prime minister. Berlusroni took advantage of a void left by scandal. 
From Nero to MUSSoOlini to Berlusron~ Italy has an unfortunate history 
with political leaders. In the post-war JX!riod a number of leaders served 
incomplete terms in office while others struggled with their own personal legal 
issues. Is Silvio Berlu!lCQl1.ian electcd rlludil/o? Herertainly doc'S not reprcscnl the 
most negative aspects of the definition as depicted by Amoldo Aleman and 
DartielOrtega. However, he docs represent the personalistic,.. charismatic aspects 
of the definition. His ambitions are limitless, he embexlies the Narbitrary whim of 
thepatronN andadherestothe u reciprocityoffavoursN {Ginsborg2005,119). He is 
determined to govern Italy in accordance with his personal vision for the country. 
However, despite surrounding himself with political acolytes, sufficient dlccks 
and balances are in place to insure that Berlusooni alone cannot dictate ltalr's 
path. 
The question of de1egative democracy is easiest for Italy. 'This is not a 
delegative democracy: it is a liberal democracy. Despite Berlusconi's claims, 
Italians did not vote for the individual who would govern Italy as he saw fit.1bey 
also did not choose, as they had in the past, their own dictator. They simply chose 
the individual that they believed would best govern their country and who 
offered a change from previous politicians. Ualianskecp voting for him likely 
because they pen:cive no strong.. viablealtemative. Berlusroni is a persuasive 
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Conclusion 
OtAvez,. Putin and Berlusroni were able to attain and maintain power due 
to the failure of a series of tlte stroctural oomponents neressary for a successful 
democracy. Democratic structures in Venezuela, Russia and Italy were weakened 
prior to the election of their leaders. Venezuelan govenunents were rendered 
ineffective by a series of inept leaders and by pacts betwttn parties. They were 
also mired in a series of economic crises. Russian governments had little 
democratic experience and Yeltliin was increasingly unreliable. Italian democracy 
was fairly strong but corruption was rampant among the political parties and the 
ensuing scandal emphasized the need for reform. These were the circumstances 
under which Chavez, Putin and Berlusooni were elected. 
Since his election CMvez has faced a weak, poorly organized opposition 
that is unable to counter his popularity. Through a series of referenda CNivez has 
changed the constitution to allow him to serve as president for life. His acolytes 
serve in important positions within government and the judiciary. The media has 
been effectively muzzled as radio and television outlets are denied licenses to 
operate while some offices of the print media are dosed. In Russia Putin left the 
constitution untouched while he, too, appointed former colleagues from the 
security service to influential government posts, restructured the judiciary and 
impeded the ability of the opposition parties to present their political platforms to 
the public. Print and electronic media outlets were also dosed. However, in this 
case individual writers, reporters and media per!lOI1-BIities were the targets of 
CJ<tremeviolence. 
Berlw;coni Ms not tampered with Italy's OOI1!ltitutiOll. However, as with 
Ou\.vez and Putin, his supporters occupy senior positions in government. Some of 
theseindividualswercl'lectcdtoofficewhileotherswcreappointedlQinfluenliai 
posts within the civil service. With a number of his supporters holding positions 
in the govemment-QWTled media the Italian prime minister has the most media 
influence among the leaders examined here. The opposition parties are weak and 
are unable to deal with Berlusconi's political style. He has an adversarial 
relationship with the judiciary which he regularly targets for reform. II is dear 
that the structural weaknesses between these countries vary significantly but it is 
the existcnce of several such weakncsses together which keeps these leaders in 
office. 
NGovemmcnt by a single - usually charismatic - leader, driven by personal 
ambitions and with little interest in building any institutions besides hill own 
perpetuation in power ... N is how Close defined elected caudillos (Oose 2IXW. 4). 
'That is who these men are. Few would deny that Ol;\.vez or Berlusconi have voter 
appeal because of their charisma. Putin is less obviously charismatic but he is no 
less popular. 
Chavez is determined to liberate Venezuelans in the style of his hero 
Bol/var.ln Chavez's case this means using the country's oil revenues to improve 
the lives of average Venezuelans while railing against the US. He established 
relations with other like-minded Latin American leaders in an attempt to create a 
zone of independence. He has a plan and a vision for the country. 
During his time in office rutin made no secret of his plan to retum Russia 
to itll once mighty place on the world stage. He governed with a plan to adUeve 
this though with limited success. Like eMvez he had power but he also has a 
plan for the nation and established programs and polities to fulfill the vision. The 
voting public in Venezuela and Russia eleded and re-elected these leaders in 
acrordance with the constitutioos as strong individuals capable of achieving their 
goals. 
BerlUS«llli is a powerful prime minister. That has already been discussed. 
However, despite his contact with the /lillian people he has no definite economic 
plan and no Nnational plan to return Italy to greatness- (Jacques 2009, 2). His time 
in office is all about him and really not about Italy at all. So Italian vo ters e1ccted 
and keep electing BerluSCOfli not because of his goals for the nation but because 
they perceive no viable alternatives. His power varies from that of Chavez or 
Putin but this does not alter his elected Ctludillo status. They are interested in 
power and what they can gain from the manipulation of that power. 
Obviously the same may be said of any political leader. However, few 
elected leaders enjoy this level of power in a political climate with insufficient 
checks and balances to counter their ambitions. The style of each of these three 
leaders is in line with a perioo of hyperexecutivism around the world. Probably, 
norle of the actions undertaken either by Ch~ve~ Putin or Berlusconi are anything 
that another world leader would not have done if he could have gotten away with 
it. However, western developed political culture and structure is stronger and 
better defined. 
Megalomania and the cult of personality are two concepts which were 
encountered frequently with reference to these leaders. The fonner lacks a specific 
political definition but is defined clinically as Na symptom of mental illness 
marked by delusions of greatness, wealth. etc. or an obsession with doing 
extravagant or grand thingsH (Webster's ... 200]' 1196).lt is not appropriate for 
individuals outside the clinical realm to judge the psychological well being of the 
leaders examined in this thesis. What these men possess is an exaggerated level of 
confidence in their own abilities and sufficient ego. This coupled with the political 
climate and political culture of the countries in question gives the apPearance of 
megalomania. 
Acrording to Scruton,. cult of pen;onality isa phrase that was established in 
Soviet Russia "to refer to the COIlcentration of political power and authority in a 
person. rather than in the office which he occupies, acoompanied by an enforced 
adulation of that person on the part of ordinary citizens, and massive propaganda 
designed to display his superhuman virtuesH (Scruton 2007, 157). This definition 
was intended to describe the leadership of Joseph Stalin. Translated into modem 
politi<:al time, and without reference to Stalin, the COIlC"ept of cult of personality 
could apply to Chavez, Putin and Berlusooni. Certainly in the (ascof ChAvez and 
rutin, votl'rs have bt.'O!"O proven to choose the man over the office. Indeed, Putin 
was believed by some Russians to hold the office of president even after Dmitrii 
Medvedev assumed office. Berlusooni's popularity is more suJ:J;ect to his 
performance in office that the other leaders. Given the meaning of cult of 
personality it is possible to maintain that this might be a suitable political 
definition for megalomania. 
It is because opponents, critics and observers view leaders such as those 
depicted in this thesis through the prism of westem-style, liberal. pluralist 
democracy that Chavez and Putin become democracy destroying dictatofll while 
Berl usconi is not. Viewed from this perspective alone Berlusconi (.'OIlld never be a 
caudillo and the way in which he governs Italy is acceptable. It does not matter 
that he has made political errors while serving as Italy's prime minister. However, 
any errors made by Chavez or Pulln are examined under a microscope and they 
are all egregious. By accepting this mooel of democracy we ignore the local 
political vernacular, which allows leaders to be viewed as caricatul'l'li of the 
individuals that they actually are. 
There appears to be a disconnect between the western stereotypical 
definition of democracy which would include nations like Canada,. the US, 
Britain, France, Germany and Italy and tho6e nations that do not follow this 
mooel precisely. It is as though observers are incapable of considering a leader 
and a govt!rnment along with the model for democracy and the political culture 
of the nation in question. In 1997 Collier and Levitsky wrote an article entitled 
"Democracy With Adjectives~. They write about the sheer number of adjectives 
needed to describe democracy in the modem world. The!;e include: NilliberaL 
tutelary, oligarchical and restrictiveN (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 440). Delegative 
would be another o f the adjectives added to democracy to tailor the definition to a 
specific situation or set of countries. 
The authors examine the need for ~precising the definition of democracy 
by adding defining attributes~ in order to "avoid classifying not entirely 
democrallc nations as democracies~ (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 442). Such. 
classification would involve a broader definition of democracy which takes into 
account the specific attributes of the poHllcal culture of the nation in question. 
While several Latin American countries are included in this artide, it is interesting 
to note that just one year before Otavez waselected to office Venezuela had yet to 
acquire an adjective despite many years of government turmoil. 
Canache is correct in that it is "premature todaim thai democracy has 
been established globally as the preeminent form of government" (Canach.e 2002. 
1). Very few of the sources consulted for this thesis acknowledged thai there may 
be any alternallve form of democracy. Instead the authors are trapped by the 
western democratic stereotype thai causes them to pronounce judgements on 
polillcal leaders thai they either do nol understand or fail to recognize within the 
context of the political culture of the !\allon in question. 
It does not matter that ChAvez. Putin and Berlusooni do not govern exactly 
as would an ideal leader of an ideal democracy. Whal does matter is thai earn 
governs in ways thai confonn to basic democratic principles. That means that 
each is elected in acoordancewith the oonstitullons of their respective natiom, 
they are successful in multiple competitive elections, checks and balanC'1,'5 on their 
power remain in place, there are few demonstrations demanding their 
resignations and dvil society continues to thrive. It does not mailer if democracy 
in VenezueJa.. Russia and even Italy varies slightly from the aC("epted nonn. The 
voters of these nations have spoken and democracy will continue to require 
adjectives. 
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